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renewed aspirations for greater collaboration 
among the ‘English-speaking peoples’, and 
the likelihood of their success
Since the late 1990s, a small but influ-
ential group of Eurosceptic politicians 
and public commentators from across 
the English-speaking world have argued 
that the Anglosphere, incorporating the 
‘core states’ of Australia, Canada, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, could provide an alterna-
tive form of international orientation if 
the United Kingdom were to leave the 
European Union. 
Brexit has thrust this idea into the 
centre of British politics. It is currently 
helping to shape the UK’s relationship 
with the EU and the rest of the world. 
For its supporters, the Anglosphere en-
compasses an extensive, but ill-defined, 
Anglophonic community bonded by a 
shared language and associated forms 
of literature, culture, sport, media and 
familial ties, as well as the mutual com-
memoration of past and present military 
conflicts, and ascription to a ‘civilisational’ 
heritage founded on the values, beliefs 
and practices of free-market economics 
and liberal democracy. In short, the An-
glosphere appears to be a better ‘fit’ for 
English-speaking countries when compared to regional 
forms of integration, not least in Britain’s case, the 
European Union.
1. Srdjan Vucetic, The Anglosphere: A Genealogy of a Racialized Identity in International Relations (Stanford University Press, 2011).
Past
Although the term ‘Anglosphere’ is a recent addition to 
the vocabulary of British foreign relations, interest in 
Anglosphere transnationalism is not new. According to 
Srdjan Vucetic, the word itself was first recorded in 1995.1 
The origins of the Anglosphere are located in the late 
19th century when imperial federation was proposed as 
a response to the growing political instability within the 
British Empire and growing competition from external 
rivals, including the United States. In a brief period from 
the early 1880s until the First World War, advocates ar-
gued for the establishment of a transnational union of 
the ‘Mother Country’ and its settler Dominions peopled 
by those of common British ‘stock’. 
The proposition of a ‘Greater Britain’ was critically 
undermined however by the reluctance of many within 
the British imperial metropole to cede significant powers 
to the settler colonies or relinquish colonial possessions. 
Ambiguities persisted amongst its proponents as to the 
membership of an imperial federation beyond Aus-
tralia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa. Some 
sought some to include Fiji, the West Indies, and even 
India and the United States within this new organisa-
tion of ‘English-speaking’ peoples. Support for imperial 
federation receded after the First World War, which en-
couraged the intensification of autonomous Dominion 
nationalisms and initiated the slow disintegration of the 
British Empire. The Second Word War accelerated this 
change. The ‘New Commonwealth’ governments that 
emerged during the post-Second World War period 
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of decolonisation rejected the racialised parameters of 
‘Greater Britain’. Finally, the UK’s accession to the Eu-
ropean Communities appeared to signal the end of the 
British Empire as an important component of the inter-
national order.
Yet the concept of the ‘English-speaking peoples’ 
was not universally rejected as a meaningful geopolitical 
and transnational community, either in the UK or across 
the Anglophone world. The Anglosphere was advanced 
as an idea by an influential international alliance of pre-
dominantly conservative politicians, commentators and 
public intellectuals who shared an insurgent ideolog-
ical and geopolitical agenda that informed ambitions 
for an alternative world order. The most prominent of 
these advocates has been American businessman James 
C. Bennett, who argues that shared history, culture, and 
language means the Anglosphere is uniquely placed to 
exploit the technological, social and economic oppor-
tunities of the 21st century.2 Anglo-American historian 
Robert Conquest suggested that a future Anglosphere 
union should be ‘weaker than a federation, but stronger 
than an alliance’.3
Present
The emergence of a right-wing Euroscepticism in the 
UK from the early 1990s encouraged and required 
a renaissance of Anglospherism as an alternative to 
membership of the European Union. Political attention 
intensified when the  Conservatives came to power as 
part of a coalition government in 2010. Leading figures, 
notably Foreign Secretary William Hague and London 
Mayor Boris Johnson, sought to exemplify the potential of 
the Anglosphere as a counterweight to Europe by seeking 
to intensify links with conservative-led governments 
amongst Britain’s ‘traditional allies’ in Australia, Canada 
and New Zealand to complement and enhance the UK’s 
relations with the EU and its other member-states.
Pushing this foreign policy realignment was the do-
mestic electoral success of the UK Independence Party 
from 2009. Euro-rejectionists like UKIP leader Nigel 
Farage went further, invoking the economic potential 
of the Anglosphere as an alternative to the member-
ship of the EU. During the Brexit referendum, senior 
Conservatives who were aligned with the ‘Leave’ cam-
paign – notably Michael Gove, Daniel Hannan and 
David Davis – also made explicit reference to the poten-
tial of the Anglosphere. Thus the Anglosphere provided 
a point of commonality amongst those campaigning 
for Brexit. 
The political appeal of the Anglosphere to British 
Brexiteers is both ideological and geopolitical. Proponents 
2. James C. Bennett, The Anglosphere Challenge: Why the English-Speaking Nations Will Lead the Way in the Twenty-First Century (Rowan and 
Littlefield, 2004). 
3. Robert Conquest, Reflections on a Ravaged Century (W.W. Norton & Company, 2000). 
4. Tim Legrand, ‘Elite, exclusive and elusive: transgovernmental policy networks and iterative policy transfer in the Anglosphere’, Policy Studies, 
37:5 (2016).
argue that the Anglosphere will afford opportunities to 
reject European social democratic values and norms – 
large welfare states, strong trade unions and high 
taxation – in favour of shared ascription to the tenets of 
neoliberalism or ‘Anglobalisation’, and the shared values 
of liberal interventionism. Geopolitically, the Anglo-
sphere’s supporters seek to re-establish and re-intensify 
Britain’s economic and political links with former colo-
nies, Dominions and other non-European states. 
Such aspirations rest on long-standing 
co-operation during the 19th and 20th centuries. One 
of the core elements of Anglosphere is the ‘Five Eyes’ 
intelligence-sharing network, a multilateral treaty for 
joint SIGINT co-operation signed in 1947 which binds 
the UK, USA, Australia, Canada and New Zealand. 
Such military links are supplemented by at least 23 
formal policy links between these five states and an un-
known number of informal networks that exist between 
political parties, think-tanks and other vested interests 
within the core Anglosphere.4
The result of the EU referendum has seen ‘Anglo-
spherism’ shift from aspirational advocacy on the fringes 
of the right to the centre of British politics, as the UK 
government has sought to re-imagine existing diplo-
matic, trade and security relationships. In her Lancaster 
House address in January 2017, Theresa May argued that 
a ‘profoundly internationalist’ post-EU ‘Global Britain’ 
In her Lancaster House speech on 17 January 2017, Prime 
Minister Theresa May set out her vision for ‘a truly Global 
Britain’. PHOTO: AFP.
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should draw on its distinctive national history and cul-
ture to ‘build relationships with old friends and new 
allies alike’. Her desire to reaffirm and strengthen ties 
with such ‘old friends’ has focused on the belief that a 
series of trade deals could be quickly concluded across 
the ‘Anglosphere’ once the UK leaves the EU. 
To this end, senior government figures made 
high-profile visits to Australia, Canada and New Zea-
land, as well as India (sometimes included amongst 
Anglosphere states). During a visit to the United States 
in January 2017, May and President Trump declared a 
shared commitment to reframe the ‘special relationship’ 
after Brexit. They emphasised that stronger ties would be 
founded ‘on the bonds of history, of family, kinship and 
common interests’.
Future
There is evidence that the Anglosphere resonates with 
the British public, especially ‘Leave’ voters.5 Yet there are 
significant barriers to realising the Anglosphere vision. 
There was and remains a lack of agreement regarding 
the constituent states of Anglosphere. Many of the most 
vocal proponents have sought to frame the Anglosphere 
around a network of core constituent ‘Crown countries’ 
that comprise of Canada, Australia, New Zealand and 
the UK (or ‘CANZUK’). Others, notably Liam Fox, 
sought to frame the Anglosphere in terms of a new 
Anglo-American alliance re-asserting its global dom-
inance. Outside of these so-called ‘core’ Anglophone 
states, it remains unclear what place there is in the An-
glopshere for states such as India, Ireland, Singapore or 
South Africa.
The immediate diplomatic goal for UK-based 
Anglospherists as the UK exits the EU is to line up new 
free-trade agreements to soften the economic rupture as 
and when the UK leaves the Single Market. To this end, 
UK government ministers have stressed that Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand are (all) ‘at the front of the 
queue’ once Brexit is realised and any transitional phase 
has passed. 
Some have questioned the professed benefits of new 
trade deals across the Anglosphere. At a conference ex-
ploring ‘The Anglosphere and its Others’ held at the 
British Academy in June 2017,6 Professor John Ravenhill 
and Professor Geoff Heubner noted that Brexit went 
against the global trend of the regional integration of na-
tional economies. With regards to the economic poten-
tial of the Anglosphere, Ravenhill and Heubner noted 
that ‘geography trumps history’. The challenge for the 
5. YouGov, September 2016.
6. The British Academy Conference on ‘The Anglosphere and its Others: The “English-speaking Peoples” in a Changing World Order’, 
held on 15–16 June 2017, was convened by Professor Michael Kenny, Dr Andrew Mycock and Dr Ben Wellings.
7. Shashi Tharoor, Inglorious Empire: What the British did to India (Hurst Publishers, 2017).
8. David Olusoga, ‘Empire 2.0 is dangerous nostalgia for something that never existed’, Guardian (19 March 2017). 
UK government, they concluded, is not to agree ‘better’ 
free-trade agreements with core Anglosphere states, but 
simply to replicate the terms and number of existing 
deals the UK enjoyed as a member of the EU. 
For many British proponents, greater engagement 
with the Anglosphere is congruent with a desire to re-
juvenate the Commonwealth through the development 
of trade links with emerging economic ‘powerhouses’, 
particularly India. Such intentions reveal, however, 
historical and contemporary complexities, both in geo-
political relations between the core Anglosphere states, 
and in the pervasive resonance of the issues of racism 
and neocolonialism across other parts of the former 
British Empire. The UK government’s trade mission to 
India in November 2016 revealed the tensions around 
establishing new trading relationships and any reciprocal 
movement of labour that such agreements might entail.
Conversely, some Commonwealth leaders have 
expressed doubts regarding the possibility that new 
trade deals with the UK could have a detrimental im-
pact on their own economies, stimulating memories 
of the exploitative nature of empire. For some, the 
post-Brexit ‘Global Britain’ vision is akin to ‘Empire 
2.0’. Indian MP Shashi Tharoor has argued that the 
post-Brexit UK government appears to suffer from a 
nostalgia-infused post-imperial ‘amnesia’ that negates 
engaging with its post-colonial responsibilities.7 British 
historian, David Olusoga, concurs, noting that plans 
for Britain’s post-Brexit trading relationship with the 
Commonwealth are informed by a nostalgic yearning 
for wealth and global influence which is more akin to a 
‘neo-colonial fantasy’.8 
Advocates of the Anglosphere appear to blend 
imperial nostalgia with historical myopia in their pro-
jection of an overly positive and largely uncritical view 
of the legacies of the British colonial past. Yet it is the 
memory of empire and the relationship of nationalism to 
it that presents one of the major barriers to the Anglo-
sphere vision. British Anglosphere advocates stress the 
importance of a common past with Canada, Australia 
and New Zealand. However, shared sentiment amongst 
the populations of the Anglosphere states that they were 
‘made in England’ has diminished and fractured con-
siderably in the wake of successive waves of immigra-
tion. Moreover, intensely national conversations about 
questions of citizenship, identity and community rarely 
invoke Anglosphere links, particularly in their consider-
ation of the devastating impact of colonisation and set-
tlement on indigenous populations. 
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Conclusion
The future of the Anglosphere will succeed or flounder 
on the fragile and precarious grip on power of The-
resa May’s minority government. The possibility of 
a future Labour government under the leadership of 
Jeremy Corbyn could encourage a very different Anglo-
sphere; one based on humanitarianism, diplomacy and 
co-operation, yet rejecting the Anglosphere’s ‘liberal 
interventionism’ strongly associated with Tony Blair’s 
period in office.
This noted, the dominant form of Anglospherism 
in the UK remains strongly associated with antipathy 
towards the EU. But British proponents are guilty of pri-
oritising British national self-interest while overlooking 
the diverse geopolitical and economic interests of the 
other Anglosphere states. Ultimately it is unlikely that 
political elites in Canberra, Ottawa or Wellington will 
risk damaging current or developing trade relations with 
the EU by prioritising trade deals with the UK. 
This does not mean a post-Brexit intensification 
of the Anglosphere will materialise once the terms of 
the UKs departure from the EU are agreed. Certainly 
it is likely that the UK government will prioritise a se-
ries of bilateral trade deals across the Anglosphere – in 
part through economic necessity, but also to legiti-
mate Brexit to domestic businesses and voters. More-
over, counter-terrorism will continue to legitimate and 
strengthen ties between the ‘Five Eyes’ states. However, 
distinctive regional contexts and economic interests, to-
gether with a shared ascription to the defence of national 
sovereignty, will encourage pragmatism and stymie calls 
by Anglospherists for closer political ties. 
This noted, the UK needs friends, and therein lies 
the appeal of the Anglosphere amongst Brexiteers. The 
Anglosphere is an idea with a long provenance in British 
politics. But although it is currently enjoying another 
moment in the sun, its future is less clear. Anglosphere 
proponents see a ‘move forward into broad, sunlit up-
lands’, but it may yet be ‘one with Nineveh and Tyre’. 
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